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LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND THE
SEAPLANE

W

rI- nearly all peacetime civilian activities are being
curtailed to aid the efforts of this country to win the
war, there is one activity which has wisely been continuedcommercial transoceanic flying.
With the use of airplanes as a means of transportation
(increasing steadily as the safety of air travel becomes recognized by the general public, and passenger surface ships are
turned to wartime duties) many new problems arise respecting the position of the airplane in the broad field of law.
One of the most pertinent problems is whether or not a
seaplane owner should be entitled to limit his personal liability the same as a shipowner.
In 1851, the United States Congress passed a limitation
of liability Act 1 for the specific purpose of encouraging investors to supply the capital necessary to rebuild our failing
merchant marine. The United States was following the
steps taken by England in 1734.2 Thus the two major maritime countries of the world recognized a doctrine which first
appeared in 1343 3 on the statute books of Peter III of
Aragon for the consular jurisdiction of Valencia. This
placed the United States on a legal parity with other maritime nations. Prior to 1851, the United States Courts ap1 LMrrED LIAnIuTy AcT of March 3, 1851, 9 STAT. 635, re-enacted by
Act February 28, 1871, 16 STAT. 458, R. S. 4281-4286, now contained with
amendments in 46 U. S. C. §§ 181-196., The original Act, together with the
history of the statute since 1851, may be found in THE MmATimE LAw AssocIATIoN oF THE UNITED STATES, CommTTEE REPORT CONCERNING LImiTATION
OF SHIPoWNERS' LIABILITy, January 30, 1935.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed a shipowners' limitation of
liability Act in 1818 (revised in 1836), and Maine passed a similar Act in 1821.
One contributing cause of the Act of 1851 was the denial of limitation by
the United States Supreme Court in New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants
Bank,
6 How. 344 (U. S.1848).
2
ENGLISH SHIiPINNG AcT of 1734, Act of 7 George II.
Amended by Act
of 7 George III (1786), and by Act of 53 George III (1813).
3 CONSULAT DE LA MER (1336 to 1343 A. D.) c. 34, Boucher's Translation
(First 45 Chapters).
Although it was not found in the twelfth century LAWS op OLERON
(ABBOTT ON SHIPPING, 93) nor in the early mediaeval maritime codes of the
City of Trani (eleventh century), nor in the laws of Wisby or the Hause
Towns (see The Rebecca, D. C. Maine, Fed. Cases 11,619 [1831]; The Main
v. Williams, 152 U. S.122, 14 Sup. Ct. 496 [1894]), it is found in the laws of
other Mediterranean cities-Statutes of Marseilles of 1253, cc. 19-25, 4 PAR-
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plied the4 ancient common law doctrine of respondeact
superior.
After the passage of the Act, many questions were presented to the courts for judicial interpretation of the statute 5
-among which were: the constitutionality of the Act (which
was upheld) ; 6 the administration of the Act; 7 who are
owners within the meaning of the Act; 8 when was the owner
DESSUS 266; ESTABLISSEMENS DE MONTPELLIER, 4 PARDESSUS 255; Assisi OF

41, 46, 1 PARDESSUS COLLECTIOx DES Lois MARITIMES, 272,
276, 280; Statute of Genoa (1588) lib. 4, cap. 13, 4 PARDuSsus 527. It appeared
in northern Europe by Statute of 1603 of Hamburgh (Statute of 1603, tit 18,
art 3, KuixE, Jus MARIT. HANS, tit 6, art. 2, p. 766) ; Swedish Stadtzlagh
statute of 1618 (Putnam [1883] 17 AM. L. Rav. 1); Swedish statute of 1667
(MARITIME CODE OF CHARLES II, pt. 1, c. 16); Holland laws of 1624 (GRonus,
DE JuRE BELLI ET PACIS, liv. 2, c. 11, par. 13; VOET, AD PAND, liv. 14, 1, 15;
HUBER, PRAEL. JUR. Civ. L. 14, 1, 19; VINNIuS, PECKIum, note p. 155) ; France,
1647 (CLEIRAC, US AND CouTUMEs DE LA MER.NAVIG. DES FLURES ET RIviEPES,
art 15, ed. 1671, p. 502; 1 VALIN 363, 629, 666; EmERIGON, C. 12, 3; BOULAY
PATY, 2 Couas DE DROIT MARITIME, 297 V. 1, 149) ; and by 1681 French statute
(ORDONNANCE DE LA MARINE, L. 1, tit 14, art. 16; liv. 3, tit. 3, art 24; CODE
DE COMMERC E 191, note 11, p. 307) ; Hanseatic Ordinance of 1644 and Ordinance
of Rotterdam of 1721.
4 Respondeat superior-imposes upon every man a duty, in the management
of his own affairs, whether personally or by his servants, so to conduct his
affairs as not to injure another. If he or his servant fails in that duty, and
another is thereby injured, he shall answer for the damage. Hantke v. Harris
Ice Mach. Works, 152 Ore. 564, 54 P. (2d) 293 (1936); 37 WoRDs AND
PHRASES (Perm. ed. 1941) 423-428; 2 BouviER, LAW DICTIONARY (1914) 2922.
See also The Bulley, 138 Fed. 170 (S. D. N. Y. 1905); The China, 7 Wall. 53
(U. S. 1868). Chancellor Kent traces this doctrine to the Bible. (2 KENT,
COMMENTARIES 269, n.1.)
See also application of this doctrine in The Rebecca, Fed. Cases 11,619
(D. C. Me. 1831); The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 126, 14 Sup. Ct 496
(1894); New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344 (U. S.
1848).
5 See nn. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, infra.
6Under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I,
§8; Lord v. Goodall, etc. SS. Co., 102 U. S.541, 26 L. ed. 224 (1880) ; Providence & N. Y. SS. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S.578, 3 Sup. Ct 279 (1883).
Under the judicial clause of the Constitution (admiralty)-Butler v. Boston
SS. Co., 130 U. S.527, 9 Sup. Ct. 612 (1889); It re Garnett, 141 U. S.1, 12,
11 Sup. Ct. 840 (1891); The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 404, 28 Sup. Ct. 133
JERusALEm, cc.

(1907).
7

"No court is better adapted than a court of admiralty to administer

precisely such relief."

(1871).

Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585

In 1872 the United States Supreme Court outlined the procedure for

limitation proceedings by ADMIRALTY RULES 54-57, 80 U. S. xiii-xiv. The

Supreme Court upheld its power to make rules in Providence & N. Y. SS. Co.
v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 3 Sup. Ct. 379 (1883). These rules were
amended on December 6, 1920 by ADMIRALTY RULES 51-54.
8 "The owner of any vessel" includes "the charterer of any vessel in case
he shall man, victual, and navigate such vessel at his own expense, or by his
own procurement"; Rv. STAT. § 4286, 46 U. S. C. 186 (1928); a corporation;
Standard Acid Works v. Chesapeake L. & T. Co., 16 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927); stockholders in a ship-owning corporation who by state law are
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free from privity and knowledge in incurring the liability; 9
made proportionately liable for the corporations' obligations; Flink v. Paladini,
279 U. S. 59, 49 Sup. Ct 255 (1929) ; a marine underwriter to which a stranded
vessel had been abandoned and which undertakes salvage operations; Craig v.
Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct 97 (1891) ; but an "owner"
does not include a manufacturer who has parted with possession although
retains legal title to protect the purchase price; American Car & Foundry Co.
v. Brassert, 289 U. S. 261, 53 Sup. Ct 618 (1933) ; a charterer other than one
considered an owner pro hac vice; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Vang, 73
F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934); The Barnstable, 181 U. S. 464, 21 Sup. Ct.
684 (1901) ; Thorp v. Hammond,79 U. S. 408, 20 L. ed. 419 (1870) ; an owner
pro hac vice does not prevent the general owner from limitation in respect to
the same vessel; Quinlan v. Pew, 56 Fed. 111 (C. C. A. 1st, 1893) ; Monongahela
River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hurst, 200 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
Foreign owners may limit in the United States against claims in this
country. The laws of the United States are applied. The Titanic, 233 U. S.
718, 34 Sup. Ct. 754 (1914). A foreign owner cannot limit, however, in case
of a wrongful act on the high seas, against a right of action granted to those
wronged by the law of the foreign ship's flag. The Vestris, 53 F. (2d) 847
(S. D. N. Y. 1931).
9 The intent of Congress was to "relieve shipowners from consequences of
all imputable culpability by reason of the acts of their agents or servants, or of
third persons, but not to curtail their responsibility for their own wilful or
negligent acts"; 19 STAT. 251 (1877), 46 U. S. C. 183 (1938) ; In re Reichert
Towing Line, 251 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), cert. denied, 248 U. S. 565,
39 Sup. Ct 9 (1918) ; United States v. Eastern Transportation Co., 59 F. (2d)
984 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); The Vestris, 60 F. (2d) 273 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
Cf. The Republic, 61 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894).
"Privity" means some fault or neglect in which the owner personally
participates. "Knowledge" means personal cognizance or means of knowledge
of which the owner is bound to avail himself, of contemplated loss or condition
likely to produce or contribute to loss, unless proper means are adopted to
prevent it. Mere negligence does not necessarily establish existence on the part
of the owner of such privity or knowledge. The Carroll, 60 F. (2d) 985, 993
(D. C. Md. 1932). The privity or knowledge must be actual, and not merely
constructive. The 84-H, 296 Fed. 427, 431 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied,
264 U. S. 596, 44 Sup. Ct 454 (1924) ; cf. The Princess Sophia, 278 Fed. 180,
188 (W. D. Wash. 1921).
Unseaworthiness of the vessel does not preclude limitation; The Galileo,
54 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), aff'd, 287 U. S. 420, 53 Sup. Ct 200
(1932) ; Standard Wholesale Phosphate v. Chesapeake Lighterage, 16 F. (2d)
765 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); The Yngay, 58 F. (2d) 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1931);
unless owner has failed to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.
The Malcolm Baxter, Jr., 277 U. S. 323, 48 Sup. Ct 516 (1928).
In dealing with corporate owners, the following persons' knowledge is
imputed to the corporation: a president; Weisshaar v. Kimball SS. Co., 128
Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904) ; a works manager; Spencer Kellogg & Sons v.
Hicks, 285 U. S. 502, 52 Sup. Ct 450 (1932) ; a manager of the entire fleet;
Boston Towboard Co. v. Darrow-Mann Co., 276 Fed. 778 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921) ;
the sole manager; The Benjamin Noble, 244 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917);
superintendent of entire fleet in remote waters; Parsons v. Empire Transportation, 111 Fed. 202 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901); marine superintendent; In re Penn
R. R., 48 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); manager at a terminal port; In re
Jeremiah Smith & Sons, 193 Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911). The following are
not persons whose knowledge is imputed to the corporation: a tug captain who
also was a director; The Marie Palmer, 191 Fed. 79 (E. D. Ga. 1911), af'd,
202 Fed. 1023 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913); a marine engineer; Craig v. Continental
Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct 97 (1891); an inspector in charge of
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the measure of value; 10 the type of liabilities; 11 and what
types of vessels are included within the Act.1 2 These problems related only to ships plying the seas.
salvation operations; Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., id. supra; a supervisor of

repairs; The Columbus, 25 F. (2d) 516 (E. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd, 25 F. (2d)
518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); a shore captain; Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Eastern
Trans. Co., 285 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922) ; an assistant to the secretary and
treasurer; In re Easterfi Dredging Co., 159 Fed. 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905) ; a
port engineer; M'Gill v. Michigan SS. Co., 144 Fed. 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906).;
a stevedore; The Colinia, 82 Fed. 665 (S. D. N. Y. 1897). The master's
knowledge was not imputed to the corporation; Lord v. Goodall SS. Co., 15
Fed. Cases 884; Quinlan v. Pew, 56 Fed. 111 (C. C. A. 1st, 1893), but by
amendment of 1936 [49 STAT. 1479 (1936), 46 U. S. C. 183 (1941 supp.) I is
now within the scope of those whose knowledge is imputed to the owner.
1oThe owner's liability shall not exceed "the amount or value of his
interest in such vessel, and her freight then pending". 49 STAT. 960, amended
in 49 STAT. 1479 (1936), 46 U. S. C. 183 (1941 supp.). An owner may transfer his interest, that is, an owner may discharge his liability by surrendering
the ship and freight, or its equivalent; The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239, 26 L. ed.
351 (1881) ; or the owner may pay into the court the value of ship and freight,
or file a stipulation of value therefor. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 26 L. ed.
1001 (1881).
The measure of the owner's "interest" in the ship is not in the statute, but
was determined by judicial decision in 1882. The Scotland, supra; The City
of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1150 (1886), to be the value of ship and
freight immediately following the disaster. The meaning of "'freight' is the
earnings of the voyage, from the carrf-age of-_passengers and merchandise,
demurrage, prepaid freight; The Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 14 Sup. Ct.
486 (1894) ; The Great Western, 118 U. S. 520, 6 Sup. Ct. 1172 (1886) ; The
Giles Loring, 48 Fed. 463 (D. C. Me. 1890). Freight does not include salvage
money; In re Meyer, 74 Fed. 881 (N. D. Cal. 1896) ; unearned freight; The
Main v. Williams, supra, nor a government subsidy which is not apportioned to
that particular voyage; The Scotland, supra; The Great Western, supra; nor
insurance; The City of Norwich, supra; Butler v. Boston SS. Co., 130 U. S.
527, 9 Sup. Ct. 612 (1889); The Princess Sophia, 61 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932).
"1The statute applies to all collision damage; Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80
U. S. 104, 20 L. ed. 585 (1871), and by amendment of 1884 applies to "all debts
and liabilities" except wages, whether or not maritime in nature. Act of June
26, 1884, 23 STAT. 57, 46 U. S. C. 189 (1928); O'Briei v. Miller, 168 U. S.
287, 18 Sup. Ct. 140 (1897). It applies to all obligations, ex contractu and
ex delicto, except those in which the liability was for the owner's own fault, or
neglect, or his personal contracts, as for instance: a charter party containing a
warranty of seaworthiness; Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U. S. 353, 38 Sup.
Ct. 330 (1918); contracts for repairs and supplies; Gokey v. Fort, 44 Fed. 364
(S. D. N. Y. 1890); The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. 665 (S. D. N. Y. 1888);
The Leonard Richards, 41 Fed. 818 (D. C. N. J. 1890); contracts for insurance; Laverty v. Clausen, 40 Fed. 542 (S. D. N. Y. 1889); or a yearly contract
for salvage; Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Mill Trans. Co., 155 Fed. 11 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1907) ; or any personal contract; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96,
32 Sup. Ct. 27 (1911).
12 "Vessel" includes "every description of water craft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water". Rnv. STAT. § 3 (1878), 1 U. S. C. § 3 (1938). Included within the
above definition of "vessel" are: a wrecked steamer; Craig v. Continental
Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638, 12 Sup. Ct. 97 (1891) ; a barge without motive power
and used for transporting excursion parties; In re Meyers Excursion & Navi-
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In 1939, nearly ninety years after the passage of the
original Act, the courts first received a petition to limit the
liability of an owner of a seaplane. 13 This raised the question
-Is a seaplane a "vessel" within the meaning of the Act,
and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
Courts?
The airplane, being an instrument of travel, has been
placed by some within the field of admiralty, and by others
within the field of land vehicles. The different types of airplanes, making use either of land, water or both, added complications which could not and did not arise in the judicial
consideration of vessels or vehicles. As a consequence, today,
seaplanes are under the general jurisdiction of the admiralty; 14 while land planes are within the province of the
civil courts.15

In 1914, it was observed that aircraft being "neither of
the land nor sea, and, not being of the sea or restricted in
their activities to navigable waters, are not maritime." 16
But in 1921, Judge Cardozo, then sitting on the New
gation Co., 57 Fed. 240 (E. D. N. Y. 1893), aff'd, 61 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 2d,
1894) ; a scow with a pile driver permanently attached thereto; In re Sanford
Ross, 204 Fed. 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); a temporary sunken drill boat;
Eastern SS. Corp. v. Great Lakes Dredge, etc., 256 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 1st,
1910); a derrick boat; Patton-Tully Trans. Co. v. Turner, 269 Fed. 334 (C. C.
A. 6th. 1920) ; a motor boat; Warken v. Moody, 22 F. (2d) 960 (C. C. A. 5th,
1927) ; a ferry boat; Grays Landing Ferry Co. v. Stone, 46 F. (2d) 394 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1931); a fishing vessel; Whitcomb v. Emerson, 50 Fed. 128 (D. C.
Mass. 1892) ; a tug; In re Vessel Owners Towing Co., 26 Fed. 169 (N. D. Ill.
1886) ; and all sea-going vessels, and all other vessels used on lakes or rivers
or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges and lighters; Rnv. STAT.
4289 (1886), 46 U. S. C. 188 (1926). But the following are not considered
"vessels" within the meaning of the statute: a sunken barge which had not been
used for a year or two; In re Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 297 Fed. 239 (W. D.
Pa. 1921), aff'd, 297 Fed. 246 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; a drydock capable of being
floated; Berton v. Tietlen & Lang Drydock Co., 219 Fed. 763 (C. C. A. 1st,
1914) ; a wharf boat incapable of being used as a means of transportation;
Evansville Co. v. Charo Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, 46 Sup. Ct 379
(1926) ; a floating boathouse used as a warehouse; Woodruff v. One Covered
Scow, 30 Fed. 269 (E. D. N. Y. 1887).
'13 Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, 27 F. Supp. 487 (S. D. N. Y.
1939).
14I NAUTH; 1 BEN DicT, ADmmALTY (1940) 118, 119.
5
2 Ai ColmmacE Acr, Act May 20, 1926, c. 344, § 7, 44 STAT. 572, 54
STAT. 1238 (1940), 49 U. S. C. 177 (1941 Supp.). There is also a Uniform
Aeronautical Law passed by several states for the regulation of intrastate
aeronautics.
16 The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269, 271 (W. D. Wash. 1914).
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York Court of Appeals, and viewing the subject as a common
law court, observed: 1
The latest of man's devices for locomotion has invaded the
navigable waters, the most ancient of his highways. Riding at anchor
is a new craft which would have mystified the Lord High Admiral
in the days when he was competing for jurisdiction with Coke and
the courts of common law.
We think the craft, though new, is subject, while afloat, to the
tribunals of the sea. Vessels in navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
In 1926, when Congress passed the Air Commerce Act,' 8
and for some years prior thereto, legal scholars centered
their attention on the place in American jurisprudence of
this new device, the airplane. The power of Congress to legislate respecting airplanes was hotly debated. Some advocated
a constitutional amendment; others contended that the treaty
making power of the Federal Government conferred this
power; others argued that the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution was sufficient and that the independent
states should regulate intrastate flying; and still others contended the admiralty clause of the Constitution gave such
power to Congress.1 9
Those favoring the use of the interstate commerce clause
of the Constitution emerged the victors, for Congress passed
the Air Commerce Act in 1926 upon that theory. 20 Contained in that statute is a section that has given to the courts
an additional problem:
Section 7. Application of existing laws relating to foreign
commerce. (a) The navigation and shipping laws of the United
States, including any definition of "Vessel" or "Vehicle" found therein and including the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not
be construed to apply to seaplanes or other aircraft * * *.
This poses the question-What properly should be considered
within the shipping and navigation laws of the United States?
17
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E.
371 (1921).
28 Am COmERCE AcT, 1926, note 15, supra.
19 See Zoilman, Admiralty Jurisdiction in Air Law (1939) 23 MARQ. L.
Rsv. 112, 116.
20 See note 18, supra.
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In 1932, it was held by a district court that a repairman
could get a maritime lien on an airplane, 21 but the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed this holding, stating:
* * * although a seaplane, while afloat on navigable waters of the
United States, may be a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction
** * it is not such a vessel while stored in a hangar on dry land,
with its engine in a shop, also on dry land, undergoing22repairs, nor
does the making of such repairs create a maritime lien.
This decision does not go so far as to deny the right of
a maritime lien to a repairman who repairs or furnishes supplies to a seaplane which is afloat on navigable waters at the
time the repairs are made or supplies furnished. This latter
point has never been judicially determined.
In 1939, the question of the right of an owner of a seaplane to limit his personal liability was presented to the district court sitting in admiralty. 23 The court held that since
Congress never contemplated the inclusion of aircraft when
passing the limitation of liability statute in 1851, the aircraft
was not a "vessel" within that statute.
Later in the same year, the question was raised again,
and another judge of the same district court, held, 24 after
a review of the authorities including the above case, that
since the primary purpose of a seaplane was to fly through
the air, and used the water only for the incidental purposes
of alighting thereon and taking off therefrom, it was not a
"vessel" within the statute defining a "vessel" 2r and hence
not subject to limitation of liability. The court therein observed "that the trend of the statutes and the courts is to
treat aviation as sui generis. It is a subject which can best
be dealt with by legislation."
The district court in this case further observed that a
seaplane or a "flying boat" of the type of the Cavalier 26
21
United States v. One Fairchild Seaplane, et al., 6 F. Supp. 579 (N. D.
Wash.
22 1924).
United States v. Northeast Air Service, 80 F. (2d) 804, 805 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).

Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, note 13, supra.
Noakes v. Imperial Airways, 29 F. Supp. 412 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
25REv. STAT. §3 (1878), 1 U. S. C. §3 (1927).
26The Cavalier, a flying boat, owned by the Imperial Airways, Ltd.
(British), which was forced down upon the high seas while en route from
New York to Bermuda.
23

24
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was practically incapable of being used as a means of transportation on water. As to this statement there probably are
many conflicting opinions among aerial-minded persons.
With the ultimate holding of the court in that case, that an
manner as a
owner cannot limit his liability in the same
27
shipowner, there are many divergent views.
One commentary, in discussing the decision, stated:
Considering the character of construction of large flying boats
now in transoceanic service, designed for surface navigation in the

event they are forced down, it seems strange that a craft such as was
involved in the principal case, utilizing the sea surface as an incident
to transportation should be without the purview of statutes drafted
to aid the development of maritime matters. It is paradoxical that
while a court of admiralty retains jurisdiction of a cause of action
alleged to have arisen in the air it should deny that a transoceanic
craft breaking up on the water is not within the extensive statutory
28
definition of a vessel. The need for Federal legislation is acute.

The same judge who decided the above case of "The
Cavalier", two years later, in 1941, had the question 29
whether or not the widow of a lost member of the crew of
a transoceanic "clipper plane" could sue under the Jones
Act " for death aboard a "vessel". Instead of deciding the
question on the basis of the reasoning employed in the prior
decision, that a seaplane was not a "vessel", the court held
that since the Air Commerce Act of 1926 31 provided that the
shipping laws of the United States were not to be applied to
seaplanes, and since the Jones Act was part of the shipping
laws, the action could not be maintained. 2
A few months after the latter decision, another judge of
33
the same district court had L similar question presented,
except that it arose under the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act.8 4 He refused to decide that a seaplane was not a
27

See (1940)

p. 1398.
28 (1940)
29

8 GEo.

WAsH.

L. RBv. 852; N. Y. L. J., March 28, 1940,

8 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 852.

Stickrod v. Pan-American Airways Co., S. D. N. Y., Civ. 9-393, opinion

filed Jan. 11, 1941, unreported.
30 Act March 4, 1915, c. 153, § 20, 38 STAT. 1185, amended June 5, 1920,
c. 250, § 33, 41 STAT. 1007, 46 If. S. C. 688 (1928).

1 Act May 20, 1926, c. 344, § 7, 44
See note 29, supra.

32
33

STAT.

572 (1926), 49 U. S. C. 177(a).

Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co. (S. D. N. Y.) 1941 A. M .C. 483.
34 Act March 20, 1920, c. 111, § 1, 41 STAT. 537, 46 U. S. C. 761.
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"vessel", and did not adopt the argument that this death
Act, even though codified in the shipping section of the
United States Code (same as the Jones Act), was part of
the shipping laws. He said:
The language of the statute [Federal Death on the High Seas
Act] makes no reference to the navigation of vessels nor to any feature of their construction or operation. A reading of the Air Commerce Act indicates an intent to set up a scheme of control of air
commerce either without or within this country with a system of
admission, registration and regulation peculiar to itself and the obvious and only sense [of the applicable section] was to avoid any conflict that might arise between its provisions and any of the statutes
regulating the admission, navigation and control of vessels. The
fact that the Death on the High Seas Act is included within [the
shipping section of the United States Code] does not necessarily require its definition as a shipping statute. The present codification of
the statutes-concluded after the enactment of the Air Commerce Act
of 1926-was an attempt to associate statutes under a heading that
would make an approach to them convenient; it had no other purpose and the preface of the code disclaims any other purpose.
This court stated that, in 1920, when the Death on the
High Seas Act was passed by Congress, "the International
Committee on Aviation had already met three times and the
aeronautical commission of the Peace Conference was a year
old. The International Flying Convention had been drafted
in 1919 and, while it was never ratified by the United States,
maybe it had, at that time, been submitted for ratification.
It is true that our transoceanic air commerce had not yet
been established but it had been discussed and few people in
1920 regarded its establishment as an improbability. The
Death on the High Seas Act was intended to confer a right
and we recognize no reason why its language should be narrowly construed whatever doubt may exist that a given set of
facts was in the minds of any of the legislators who framed
or adopted it. Laws giving a right of action for tort are
never definite in their language and intentionally so. This
follows from their nature for no one can imagine all the
exigencies out of which causes of action arise and legislators
wisely refrain from attempting to state them."
The reasoning employed in the above case, the latest
dealing with the seaplane, might equally be applied to the
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limitation of liability statute, despite the fact that it was
passed in 1851, before the airplane was invented.
Another feature of air law was developed at the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, at which it was recommended that the
liability of an aircraft owner be limited. The resolution of
this convention was adhered to by the United States, by
presidential proclamation in 1934, as advised by the United
States Senate.3 5 However, as pointed out by one district
court, there is no enabling act by Congress, and therefore an
American owner cannot avail himself of the benefits of the
3
treaty in our courts. 6
Mention should be made of two conflicting foreign decisions, one in which a disabled seaplane towed on the surface
of the water was held to be a merchant vessel in German
courts, 37 and the other in which a contrary conclusion was
reached in Scotland.3 8 However, since the latter decision
was handed down, the English Parliament expressly extended
the principle of maritime salvage to aircraft and their cargoes
in distress upon navigable waters.3 9 The Irish Free State
40
thereafter enacted it into its laws.
The opposing reasons for support of the divergent views,
as expressed in the above cases, leaves the layman and the
legal student in a quandary as to the place of the seaplane
in the field of law.
There is little doubt but that the subject of air law is
sui generis. It is conceded that when Congress passed the
Limitation of Liability Act in 1851, it did not envisage the
"flying boat"; and when the Jones Act and the Death on the
High Seas Act were passed they were never intended to
apply to a seaplane; nor when the Air Commerce Act of 1926
was passed, did Congress conceive of transoceanic flights.
But is this reason enough for denying the benefits of these
statutes to persons who would be entitled to such benefits if
3549 STAT.

Oct. 12, 1929.
58

3000 (1934);

REPORT OF WARSAW CONVENTION,

arts. 17, 22,

See note 33, supra.

37 1 Arch Fuer Luftrecht 54 (1931) ; 2 J. Am L. 588, 590 (1931).
88 Watson v. R. C. Victor Co., 1935 U. S. Av. Rep. 147.
39 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 415.
40
Iusa
NAVIGATION ACT of 1936, Public Statutes of the Oireachtas No. 40
of 1936, Part VII.
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the courts predicated their decisions upon a common sense,
rather than legalistic basis?
It must be remembered that the Air Commerce Act
(which excludes the seaplane from the definition of a
"vessel" under the shipping laws) was enacted before Lindbergh's historic flight in 1927 across the Atlantic to France,
which flight was followed by an epidemic of similar ones.
It antedates by many years the present passenger and freight
services. The Congress certainly could not have imagined
the volume of air traffic as it is today, or will be in the future.
The modern "flying boat" is capable of surface transportation, despite the fact that its primary purpose is travel
by air, even though its seaworthiness in riding out a storm
or gale upon the surface of the high seas might be questioned.
The courts, burdened with the prior decisions, are reluctant
to include the seaplane within the scope of the statutes heretofore discussed. Legal reasoning might substantiate some
of these decisions, but on principle alone, it would seem to
the average person that seaplane owners are entitled to the
same benefits as shipowners, and statutes created for the
benefit of shipowners should be extended for the relief of
seaplane owners.
If the courts will not take upon themselves the task of
including the seaplane within the definition of "vessel", as
the court did when applying the Death on the High Seas
Act (supra), the old accusations of "narrow legal interpretation" which do not permit the injection of new ideas and
theories to aid the old doctrines, again will be the subject of
newspaper editorials and legal debates.
But is the fault with the courts? it is academic that
judges should not "judicially legislate", for this field belongs
to Congress alone. For many years, in the judicial and legislative history of this country, the courts have been accused
of doing just that, justly and unjustly.
The limitation of liability statute was enacted to encourage capital in ships and shipping, and this purpose will
necessarily have to be applied, in the near future, to the air
transport business, and especially is this true if the United
States is to maintain its lead in transoceanic and PanAmerican commercial flying.
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But whether the present statute is adequate to cover
the unique questions involving the airplane is another problem. It seems clear that judicial decision can do little in
view of the present state of the law. It is a task for Congress which undoubtedly must sooner or later be undertaken.
The need for legislation is apparent, for under the different opinions expressed by the courts, airplane owners do
not know whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of
the statute. Perhaps, since most disabled planes are either
totally lost or worth very little after a crash, the remedy
would be to enforce the English rule, namely, that the value
of the ship be measured just prior to the disaster, or something similar thereto--as for instance-a limitation to a
fixed sum per gross ton of the plane.
Mention should be made of those who advocate abolition
of all limitation of liability statutes. The argument advanced is that with our modern insurance system, together
with modern communications eliminating many of the risks
of the high seas as well as subordinating the master of the
vessel to a secondary position under the owner, the necessity
of limtation of liability is no longer apparent. This, however, is a problem for Congressional action, or perhaps international treaty, with which we are not concerned at present.
JOHN J. GATLAND, Ju.

